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TYRONE GARNER'S LAWRENCE v. TEXASt
Marc Spindelman*
FLAGRANT CONDUCT: THE STORY OF LAWRENCE V TEXAS. By Dale
Carpenter. New York and London: W.W. Norton & Co. 2012. Pp.
xv, 284. $29.95.
Dale Carpenter's Flagrant Conduct: The Story of Lawrence v. Texas has
been roundly greeted with well-earned praise. After exploring the book's
understanding of Lawrence v. Texas as a great civil rights victory for les-
bian and gay rights, this Review offers an alternative perspective on the
case. Built from facts about the background of the case that the book sup-
plies, and organized in particular around the story that the book tells
about Tyrone Garner and his life, this alternative perspective on Lawrence
explores and assesses some of what the decision may mean not only for
sexual orientation equality but also for equality along the often-
intersecting lines of gender class, and race. Lawrence emerges in this light
not as a singular victory for lesbian and gay civil rights, or perhaps even
for civil rights more generally, but as a complexly mixed opinion about and
for equality in society and under law.
I'm not a hero. But Ifeel like we've done something good
for a lot of people. Ifeel kind of proud of that.
-Tyrone Garner (p. 277)
We still have a lot of work to do as far as getting
equal treatment and jobs and housing and employment.
-Tyrone Garner (p. 277)
[Flew remember Garner or invoke his name.
-Dale Carpenter (p. 277)
t Copyright © 2013, by Marc Spindelman. All rights reserved. Permissions regarding
this Review should be directed to mspindelman@gmail.com.
* Isadore and Ida Topper Professor of Law, The Ohio State University's Moritz Col-
lege of Law. For especially helpful engagements as this Review took shape, many thanks to
Cinnamon Carlarne, Amy Cohen, Brookes Hammock, Christiana Martenson, Richard Muniz,
and Robin West. For help with sources, thanks to Susan Azyndar of the Moritz Law Library,
and for research help, thanks to Syane Roy and Liz Wiseman.
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I. LAWRENCE V TEXAS AND THE POLITICS OF CIVIL RIGHTS
The early returns on Dale Carpenter's Flagrant Conduct: The Story of
Lawrence v. Texas1 have persistently been in the mode of high praise.2 It is
easy to see why. This history of Lawrence v. Texas-culturally and legally,
one of the most discussed U.S. Supreme Court decisions of the last dec-
ade, and for lesbian and gay equality the most significant constitutional
breakthrough to date3-brings many of the people and events behind the
decision, hence the decision itself, to life in a thoroughly engaging and in-
formative way. The book's deeply human-centered approach, in which
Lawrence, as a legal, political, and cultural event, is revealed as the product
of a vast and complex set of human actions and interactions over extended
time and space, humanizes Lawrence by naming many of the figures who
made it possible along the way. In the process, the book also humanizes the
legal process itself, showing that it is populated by individuals-not name-
less, faceless bureaucrats-who can be recognized, identified with, and, in
many cases, thanked. By returning the legal system to the public this way,
the book reveals the democratic and egalitarian spirit animating it, a spirit
that is felt in its narrative progression-Lawrence v. Texas as progress and
justice achieved-as well as in its crystal-clear, at times beautiful, prose.
As it happens, the same democratic and egalitarian spirit that animates
the book also animates its unabashedly pro-lesbian-and-gay-equality stance,
a stance within which the book achieves what many readers will regard as a
notable degree of fairness and balance. Carpenter has his views, of course,
and his own pro-gay political blend. But despite his associations with liber-
tarianism and Log Cabin Republicanism, and his conservative advocacy for
marriage equality, the book does not read like it is pushing a conservative
political brand. Yes, at moments-some subtle, some not-the book evinces
sympathies for conservatisms that might track Carpenter's views. But in one
of the book's many surprises, it offers grist for a more radically progressive
outlook and perspective on Lawrence than any true conservative, pro-gay
manifesto ordinarily would choose. Through this telling, the book thus sur-
passes its title's claim. "The Story of Lawrence v. Texas" actually packs
plurals-stories-with facets and dimensions that exceed a single plotline
linked to a single-minded political game.
On its own terms, the book's account of Lawrence is filled with heroes
of different sizes and shapes, more, certainly, than one would have guessed
1. Dale Carpenter is the Earl R. Larson Professor of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties
Law, University of Minnesota Law School.
2. See, e.g., David Cole, The Gay Path Through the Courts, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Apr. 5,
2012, at 34; Sanford Levinson, The Gay Case, TEx. MONTHLY, Mar. 2012, at 62; Dahlia
Lithwick, Extreme Makeover, NEW YORKER, Mar. 12, 2012, at 76; Michael O'Donnell, From
Brown to Lawrence, NATION, Apr. 16, 2012, at 32; David Oshinsky, Strange Justice, N.Y
TIMES, Mar. 18, 2012 at BR 1, http:// http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/18books/review/the-
story-of-lawrence-v-texas-by-dale-carpenter.html.
3. The book's index contains one entry for "bisexuality" and none for "transgender."
See pp. 329, 344.
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based only on the judicial reports. Appropriately, the narrative repeatedly
swirls around John Geddes Lawrence and Tyrone Garner,4 "two humble
men" but major "civil rights heroes" for delivering their sodomy arrests as
the vehicle for challenging Texas's and twelve other states' sodomy bans.
5
But there are numerous other figures, many unknown publicly before now,
whose actions, seemingly inconsequential when undertaken, turn out to be
historically significant; they themselves, heroes in retrospect. Who knew
before this telling, for instance, that Lawrence v. Texas might not have hap-
pened but for a "'gossipy' conversation" (p. 118) one night at a Houston
gay bar where Nathan Broussard, a file clerk in the state court where Law-
rence's and Garner's cases were initially filed, and his partner, Mark Walker,
a Harris County Sheriff's Office sergeant, mentioned the arrests to their bar-
tender, Lane Lewis? Lewis, who "was active in the gay civil rights
movement," "knew that gay activists in Texas had been waiting for years to
get a sodomy case based on an arrest of two adults in the privacy of the bed-
room."6 He instantly recognized the potential for the arrests. "At that
moment ... Lawrence v. Texas was set on a legal trajectory no one there
could have anticipated" (p. 118).
With all the heroes populating this book, the appearance of a fair share
of villains is expected, for narrative symmetry at least. The book does not
disappoint on this score. Some dark figures do appear. William Blackstone,
J. Edgar Hoover, and Paul Cameron, along with other Christian moralists,
including Anita Bryant-types, and Texas Republicans who, at times, do their
bidding, all spring to mind, as do the authors of some frothily antigay ami-
cus briefs filed in Lawrence with the Supreme Court. But by the time this
work is out, history's die is cast. Lawrence, decided in pro-lesbian-and-gay
directions, keeps supporters of sodomy laws from being true villains any
more, having lost the power they once possessed to hold homosexuality's
legal fate entirely in their hands. Even Justice Antonin Scalia, who some
will see as one of the work's major antiheroes, roaring in his rejection of the
liberty and equality claims in Lawrence, roars in impotence-a diminished
status that is gently but unmistakably announced by Paul Smith, Lawrence
and Garner's lawyer before the Court, when Scalia puts him on the spot dur-
ing oral arguments (pp. 223-24).
Among the various characters in Carpenter's book, one figure heroically
stands out above them all: Lawrence v. Texas itself. Famously, Lawrence
announces a right to sexual intimacy that lesbians and gay men, like their
heterosexual counterparts, are free to enjoy, a right that leads the Supreme
Court to declare that criminal prohibitions on sodomy between consenting
adults constitutionally fall. An unequivocal triumph in these pages,
4. Officially Tyron Garner, he "actually preferred the spelling Tyrone," hence "Ty-
rone" here and throughout. Douglas Martin, Tyron Garner 39, Plaintiff in Sodomy Case, N.Y
TIMES, Sept. 14, 2006, at D8.
5. P. 281; see also Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 573 (2003).
6. P. 117-18. This story was sketched in earlier form in Dale Carpenter, The Unknown
Past of Lawrence v. Texas, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1464 (2004).
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Lawrence's stature is felt throughout. In the work's bleakest moments, the
gloomiest days of lesbian and gay rights-when they had not been con-
ceived or did not exist as such, or when some initial successes, like a
Houston city ordinance banning antigay discrimination (pp. 28-36), come
under siege-Lawrence stands as a lighthouse in the distance, beaconing
brightly. Lawrence itself is the book's very happy ending, whether pro-
lesbian-and-gay sequels follow in the Supreme Court, as seems likely, or
not.7 Like other judicial decisions, Lawrence may flatten out the lived facts
behind it, but when its details and dimensions are filled back in, it is a major
and majorly felicitous event. It is just what Carpenter's book's subtitle touts:
the opinion heralding freedom that "decriminalized gay Americans."
The centrality of Lawrence's heroism to the structure of Carpenter's
book helps explain why commentary has regularly zeroed in on two revela-
tions that the work serves up.8 Individually and together, they suggest that
Lawrence's flattened-out facts may be flat out wrong in important respects.
One piece of news-confirming suspicions that some commentators previ-
ously held-is that Lawrence's representation of Lawrence and Garner as a
couple in a marriage-like relationship is false. Not lovers, friends with bene-
fits, or simply sexual regulars, "Lawrence and Garner never became much
more than acquaintances. They were never in a romantic or sexual relation-
ship with each other, either before or after the sodomy arrests."9 More
spectacular is the "probabilistic" conclusion that not only were Lawrence
and Garner not in an intimate or sexual relationship, but they were also
probably not even having the sex that they were arrested and convicted for
(pp. xii-xiii). A careful and important subplot develops the basis for this
startling conclusion, which as an educated surmise, never achieves the status
of hard fact. Close to it, the conclusion is well substantiated, including by
Lawrence himself, who repeatedly insists that "'[t]here was no sex,'" and
that the police who swore otherwise swore to "'bald-face lies'" (p. 71).
Corroborating, Garner at one point presents a version of events "obviously
inconsistent with the claim that the men were having sex when the police
arrived" (p. 72), elsewhere laughing aloud on hearing that the lead officer at
the arrest said that he and Lawrence "continued to have sex after [officers]
entered the bedroom" (p. 73).
The idea that there was no intimacy or even just sex behind the case that
finally gave the United States a constitutional right to sexual intimacy has
stirred up a brouhaha in some legal quarters. 10 Is something amiss about
7. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 786 (2012)
(No. 12-144); Petition for Writ of Certiorari, United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 786 (2012)
(No. 12-307).
8. See, e.g., Cole, supra note 2, at 34; Levinson, supra note 2, at 63; Lithwick, supra
note 2, at 77-78; Oshinsky, supra note 2, at 10. For an earlier rendition of these facts, see
Carpenter, supra note 6.
9. P. 45; see also pp. 134, 280.
10. This, in part, is to paraphrase Dahlia Lithwick. See Lithwick, supra note 2, at 77-78
("That's the punch line: the case that affirmed the right of gay couples to have consensual sex
in private spaces seems to have involved two men who were neither a couple nor having
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burying facts like these in a high-profile case like this?" What effects, if
any, might these revelations have? Will they reinforce stereotypes about
homosexual mendacity? Will they harm the success of future lesbian-and-
gay-rights litigation?
Answers aside, the real news of Lawrence in this work is what it has
been all along: the decision's announcement of a right to sexual intimacy on
constitutional grounds. This announcement is, in fact, so important to the
book's account that its climax is structured around it, including immediate
reactions in the decision's wake.
The scene, masterfully set, captures feelings that many lesbians, gay
men, and their allies had in anticipation of, and on hearing, the Lawrence
Court's ruling. As the High Court's term draws to an end, many lesbians,
gay men, and their allies are anxiously awaiting the Court's Lawrence opin-
ion. Lawyers from Smith's firm, including Smith himself, begin appearing
on "opinion-reading days toward the end of the term, just in case Lawrence
[is] announced" (p. 253). The term's final week arrives, and Monday comes
and goes without a decision in the case. More waiting. No announcement
will come until the last day of the term.
That day: "hazy and humid air," morning "temperature ... already in the
low eighties ... as gay rights attorneys, academics, and law students beg[in]
filling the courtroom to hear what the Justices [will] say" (p. 254). Luminar-
ies, including Laurence Tribe, "on the losing side seventeen years earlier [in
Bowers v. Hardwick], also [take] a seat" (p. 254).
Calling the case, Chief Justice Rehnquist announces that Justice Kenne-
dy will read. "The room tense[s] up. The anticipation felt by people who
ha[ve] worked on [Lawrence] for almost five years, and on the larger cause
for longer, [is] palpable" (p. 255). What does it mean that Justice Kennedy
has written the opinion? Have they lost or won? Cut to the New York City
headquarters of Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, where Lambda
lawyer Susan Sommer is "watching CNN and refreshing her web browser
every few seconds to find out the result" (p. 256). One nearly hears and feels
the nervous clicks of a computer mouse.
Pan back to Justice Kennedy, who begins reading the Court's opinion,
his voice "uncharacteristic[ally] quaver[ing]" (p. 256). In Carpenter's book,
the opinion's language is interspersed with Carpenter's own commentary.
"[T]he question before the Court" and some of the case's facts-including
that "officers observed Lawrence and another man, Tyron Gamer, engaging
in a sexual act" (p. 256)-begin. Then, soon, a hint-the first-"that the
Court might rule against Texas": the declaration that the Court "deem[s] it
necessary to revisit this Court's holding in Bowers [v. Hardwick]" (p. 257).
Kennedy continues, declaring that Hardwick "fail[ed] to appreciate the ex-
tent of the liberty at stake" (p. 257). This-at last!: The "moment that
sex."). For an important reply to Lithwick, see Kevin Cathcart, Lawrence v. Texas: Extreme
Truth, HuLFINGTON POST (Mar. 7, 2012, 5:25 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/kevin-
cathcart/Iawrence-v-texas-extreme-truthb_ 1327426.html.
11. Pp. 298-99 n.30; see also p. 135.
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perceptive observers like Smith and [Lambda's Ruth] Harlow realize[] what
[is] happening" (p. 257). Emotional gates open. "Tears [begin] to well up in
the eyes of many in the courtroom" (p. 257). The reading proceeds, "over-
whelm[ing] the best efforts of many gay-rights advocates to conceal their
feelings" (p. 258).
By the time the formal reversal of Bowers v. Hardwick is announced,
"[o]verwhelmed by what [is] happening, many of the gay and lesbian advo-
cates sitting in the gallery [are] openly sobbing" (p. 259). "Justice Kennedy
s[ees], and obviously fe[els], the reaction of the gallery. He seem[s] almost
to choke up himself, catching his words as he sa[ys] that [Hardwick] was
wrong 'when it was decided and it is not correct today.'" (p. 259).
Few readers with pro-lesbian-and-gay sympathies will read this passage
and remain unmoved.
Outside of the Court, effusion spreads and quickly swells. In a series of
where-were-you-when moments, news of the decision blazes across the
country. From Washington, D.C., to Houston, Texas, the central figures in
the case-Lawrence and Garner-learn of the decision in unspectacular
ways: Lawrence from television news; Garner from a phone call from
Mitchell Katine, a lawyer who helped represent him (and Lawrence) during
the state-court phase of the case. 12 Joy spreading, the book's sights turn to
reactions from cultural conservatives, including Reverend Fred Phelps, who,
unimpressed, in perfect homophobic pitch, declares Lawrence "the death
knell of American civilization" and "a covenant with death and an agree-
ment with Hell" (p. 268).
Meanwhile, celebrations erupt in lesbian and gay communities nation-
wide. The book tallies events both in many of the major metropolitan areas
that one might expect and in other locales that one might not. Missouri
alone, a state that only hours before had been "one of the four states with a
specifically antigay sodomy law," hosts "rallies celebrating the decision ...
in Columbia, St. Louis, Kansas City, and Springfield" (p. 270). Perhaps
most memorable is the reaction in San Francisco, which centers on the huge,
famous rainbow flag that flies "atop an eighty-foot pole at the corner of Cas-
tro and Market streets"-a flag whose design "first emerged for the 1978
San Francisco pride parade, the summer before Harvey Milk's assassina-
tion" (p. 271). Lowered for a single day, it is "replaced by an American
flag" (p. 271). During the ceremony, a group of veterans, "several of whom
had been expelled from military service for being gay, saluted as ... a gi-
gantic American flag [was raised] in its place. A rousing cheer went up....
The crowd sang the national anthem" (p. 272).
The revelers' reveling needs and receives no detailed, after-the-fact ex-
planation. It is obvious what all the elation is for. Not to miss it, the San
Franciscans' gesture carries the thought: No longer outlaws, lesbians and
gay men were celebrating finally becoming full Americans-red-blooded,
country-loving, flag-waving, "God Bless America"-singing patriots, all
(pp. 270-77, 282).
12. Reasons for the qualification are on p. 154.
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A more nuanced understanding of Lawrence emerges from the book's
larger account, in which the Court's opinion results directly from the pro-
lesbian-and-gay litigation strategy in the Supreme Court-litigation stage of
the case. Seen this way, Lawrence is not a breakthrough announcing radical
constitutional values that were unknown the day before, but rather a deci-
sion affirming a preexisting social and legal order on morally conservative
grounds.
According to the book, lesbian-and-gay-rights advocates, led by Smith's
team, urged the Court to recognize that the Constitution promises
protections for consensual intimate relations, including same-sex intimate
relations, "for individualistic and communitarian reasons" (p. 193). "[T]he
[main] brief [for Lawrence and Garner] carefully focused on sex as
normatively desirable in connection with stability, commitment, and
family-not in connection with a broader sexual liberation" (p. 193). The
strategy's political torque is spotlighted:
The Lawrence team was making the most conservative argument possible
for a constitutional right to sex. Overturning the Texas law would be a vin-
dication of traditional American values-like respect for individual
autonomy, privacy, relationships, the home, and families-in a changed
world. The petitioners' brief was not the rejection of morality in favor of
immorality or even amorality. It was an embrace of neotraditional morality.
(p. 194)
Neotraditional moral arguments moved hand in hand with a strategic
mantra, repeatedly echoed in the book, that, in granting Lawrence and Gar-
ner the relief they sought, the Supreme Court would be "following, not
leading" the nation (pp. 192, 233). Based on what Carpenter writes, Law-
rence embraces the moral premise that lesbian and gay advocates urged,
making it "an embrace of neotraditional morality" and a preservation, if also
a modest expansion, of the status quo to boot (p. 194).
The book seems untroubled by Lawrence's moral conservatism, maybe
pleased by it, though champagne-soaked ebullience is formally left to others
to express (p. 270). At the same time, nobody who reads this story can for-
get the radically ambitious, and not-at-all conservative, lesbian and gay
sexual politics that, over a span of space and time, made Lawrence conceiv-
able, especially as a conservative, status-quo-oriented win.
The book pays these radical politics respects in different ways, but the
most affirmative treatment they receive is as historical artifact (p. 199). The
radicalism of lesbian and gay politics does not figure prominently in these
pages as politics endowing political legacies that are alive and well in the
present tense. Critiques, for instance, that take aim at the conservatism of the
pro-lesbian-and-gay litigation strategy pursued at the Supreme Court or at
Lawrence itself for rewarding it--critiques that find inspiration in these radi-
cal traditions-are dutifully acknowledged in passing, but no, or not much,
more (p. 194). What these critiques believe Lawrence leaves undone and what
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they hold should be made of that, the book, for its own part, more or less ig-
nores.13
What appears instead in these pages as the work that Lawrence leaves
undone is work that is recognizable less for its proximity to radical lesbian
and gay politics than to the neotraditional morality in the case and to the
political mainstream of the lesbian-and-gay-rights movements. 14 Speaking
broadly and somewhat schematically, the work that the book sees as follow-
ing in Lawrence's wake is the project of taking lesbian and gay rights down
a well-known and well-established path of civil rights.
What this civil rights path entails, or at least what some of its big-ticket
action items are, is discussed when the book specifies what Lawrence does
not do on its own. Understanding that Lawrence's invalidation of sodomy
laws punishing consensual, adult sexual intimacies relies on a decision prin-
ciple that equates same-sex with cross-sex intimacies, the book notes that
the opinion stops short of embracing the equation's implications for tradi-
tional marriage laws (p. 283). Likewise, the book recognizes that
Lawrence's constitutional respect for same-sex intimacies and lesbians and
gay men could have been-but was not-taken to invalidate the "Don't Ask,
Don't Tell"'15 policy that restricted military service by lesbians and gay men,
keeping them from openly offering body, service, and life to defend a cher-
ished nation (pp. 283-84). What's more, Lawrence formally leaves
untouched the existing structure of antidiscrimination laws at the local,
state, and federal levels. After Lawrence, "in most states [and for the most
part under federal law,] ... a person could still be fired from a job or denied
housing simply because he was gay."' 6 These three items-marriage, mili-
tary, and the existing rubric of antidiscrimination laws-are not mentioned
by happenstance. They cohere a larger whole as signature elements within a
mainstream lesbian and gay civil rights program.
As these details come into view, so does the debt that this lesbian and
gay civil rights project owes the traditional civil rights program for race
equality under law. Among its major victories are now regularly counted
access to marriage on race-equal, or at least race-neutral, terms, as well as a
13. See infra Part I for thoughts along these lines.
14. This is not to forget how the work that Lawrence leaves undone relates to the U.S.
public's willing acceptance-beyond-toleration of lesbians and gay men.
15. 10 U.S.C. § 654 (2006), repealed by Don't Ask, Don't Tell Repeal Act of 2010,
Pub. L. No. 111-321, 124 Stat. 3515.
16. P. 277; see also p. 283. There are some protections under federal law against homo-
phobic discrimination that should be noted. These protections treat antigay discrimination as
unlawful when it operates as other forms of discrimination, including sex and disability dis-
crimination. On sex discrimination, see, for example, Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel Inc., 305
F.3d 1061, 1063-64 (9th Cir. 2002). On disability discrimination, see, for example, Bragdon
v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 641-42 (1998). In the housing context, there have been some notable
recent developments. See, e.g., Equal Access to Housing in HUD Programs Regardless of
Sexual Orientation or Gender Identity, 77 Fed. Reg. 5662 (Feb. 3, 2012) (to be codified at 24
C.F.R. pts. 5, 200, 203, 236, 400, 570, 882, 891, 892).
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right to military service and protections against discrimination through a
range of positive law rules.
While both of these civil rights programs come in different forms, hence
frame the precise content of civil rights goals in different ways, or anyway
with different inflections on central themes, the lesbian and gay civil
rights project in its principal form, borrowing from race-equality strug-
gles, 17 is organized around formal equality norms. These norms seek the
integration of lesbians and gay men into institutions long defined by their
heterosexuality, including, as a cornerstone, what Lawrence gives: nonout-
lawry for same-sex sex.1
Within this general framework, and driving Lawrence in different ways,
the harm of antigay discrimination is in what the sodomy laws meant to do
and did: deny lesbians and gay men an attribute of personhood or individual
choice, or, in what amounts to much the same thing, impose group-based
outlawry, exclusion, or marginalization on the basis of a morally irrelevant
characteristic-the gender of one's sexual or love choice. The parallels to
race discrimination are readily seen. A, if not the, central harm of race dis-
crimination has often been thought to be making race the measure of an
individual's talents, abilities, or willingness to satisfy the basic obligations
of institutional membership or citizenship writ large, hence full membership
in a community of equals, when it is not and should not be. As earlier civil
rights struggles not only sought to eliminate state-based discrimination, but
also to secure positive legal rights to freedom from discrimination in the
public and private realms, the lesbian and gay rights civil rights project has
pursued access to those institutions defined by their heterosexuality, like
marriage and the military, as well as to the civil rights structure defined in
both heterosexualized and racialized terms.19 The point of opening the civil
17. Or at least joining the liberalism sometimes underlying them. Not all race-equality
struggles operate uncritically in this traditional liberal civil rights mode. See, e.g., Derrick A.
Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L.
REV. 518 (1980); Robert S. Chang & Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., Nothing and Everything:
Race, Romer, and (Gay/Lesbian/Bisexual) Rights, 6 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 229 (1997);
Kimberl6 W. Crenshaw, Close Encounters of Three Kinds: On Teaching Dominance Feminism
and Intersectionality, 46 TULSA L. REV. 151 (2010); Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Mar-
gins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L.
REV. 1241 (1991); Kimberl6 Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transfor-
mation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331 (1988); Angela
P. Harris, From Stonewall to the Suburbs?: Toward a Political Economy of Sexuality, 14 WM.
& MARY BILL RTS. J. 1539 (2006); Francisco Valdes, Queers, Sissies, Dykes, and Tomboys:
Deconstructing the Conflation of "Sex," "Gender," and "Sexual Orientation" in Euro-American
Law and Society, 83 CALIF. L. REV 1 (1995); see also Alan D. Freeman, Antidiscrimination Law:
A Critical Review, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 96 (David Kairys ed.,
1982); Alan Freeman, Antidiscrimination Law: The View from 1989, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A
PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 121 (David Kairys ed., rev. ed. 1990).
18. Despite convergences, the mainstream lesbian and gay civil rights project does not
mirror the trajectory of race-based civil rights in every last respect.
19. This holds at the national and state, including local, level. See, e.g., Matthew Shep-
ard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 111-84, 123 Stat. 2835
(2009); Hate Crimes Statistics Act, Pub. L. No. 101-275, 104 Stat. 140 (1990); Violent Crime
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rights structure to protections against sexuality-based discrimination is no
different than the balance of the political program: to guarantee that lesbians
and gay men receive all the same rights, benefits, and protections in society
and under law that heterosexuals have or otherwise do not need.
20
Against this backdrop, Lawrence, with its elimination of sodomy bans
on morally conservative grounds equating, hence assimilating, lesbians' and
gay men's intimacies to those of their heterosexual counterparts, does not
only serve to point to work within the civil rights project that remains to be
done. Lawrence is, in itself, a major victory within and for that project.
Hence Carpenter's report that Lawrence is "the most important gay civil
rights decision so far in American history" (p. 41).
On the following logic, it is: Lawrence's elimination of homosexuality's
outlawry is driven by a message of inclusion and integration into the larger
community of constitutional persons entitled to, for now, at least, some
basic constitutional rights. The conservatism of Lawrence's underlying
neotraditional, moralizing rationale does not change this. Indeed, it is a
powerful argument sounding in shared constitutional values that collectively
declare the exclusion of lesbians and gay men from all the existing
structures of social, political, and civil life is unwarranted, at least when that
exclusion is grounded in traditional moral opposition to homosexuality and
when lesbians and gay men are only seeking treatment equal to their
heterosexual counterparts. Synched with this thought is the impulse behind
characterizations of Lawrence as the lesbian and gay equivalent of Brown v.
Board of Education,1 still widely seen as the greatest legal victory for race-
based civil rights.22
A victory of this magnitude, Lawrence does not only clear a trail for civ-
il rights victories to come. For a complex set of reasons having to do with
the social, political, and legal uptake of the Supreme Court's constitutional
decisions, and in a complex set of ways, Lawrence legitimates and normal-
izes homosexuality and same-sex relations beyond invalidating sodomy
bans. Its principle of respect for same-sex intimacies and their equation with
heterosexual intimacies-no matter how conservative-is a principle that,
unleashed, may issue a constitutional call for the reconsideration in other
public arenas of the justifications for a range of governmental policies keep-
Control and Law Enforcement Act, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994); Civil Rights
Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73; Employment Non-Discrimination Act, H.R.
1397, 112th Cong. (2011); Ohio Equal Housing and Employment Act, H.B. 176, 128th Gen.
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2010); see also H.B. 335, 129th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio
2011).
20. Cf Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996).
21. 347 U.S. 483 (1954); see, e.g., Cole, supra note 2, at 34; O'Donnell, supra note 2,
at 32.
22. This despite reconsiderations of important aspects of this popular account in GER-
ALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 39-
172 (2d ed. 2008); Bell, supra note 17; and Michael J. Klarman, How Brown Changed Race
Relations: The Backlash Thesis, 81 J. AM. HIST. 81 (1994). For some, of course, Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), surpasses Brown in terms of doctrinal significance.
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ing lesbians and gay men out of the mainstream or at the margins of social,
political, and legal life.
23
Carpenter's book details some ways in which Lawrence has had
precisely these effects. Outside of the Supreme Court, a series of changes in
laws relating to lesbians and gay men and sexual orientation discrimination
have transpired since Lawrence came down. As the book points out,
Lawrence's gravitational force has been felt in struggles for marriage
equality at the state level. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court's
decision in Goodridge v. Department of Public Health,24 the first decision to
require full marriage equality at the state level, takes Lawrence and its logic
as its model (p. 283). Notably, one of Lawrence's greatest extrajudicial
successes so far is the way that its ideals played out in the demise of "Don't
Ask, Don't Tell. '25 Acknowledging that too many factors were in play to say
that Lawrence singularly precipitated the law's repeal or other recent pro-
lesbian-and-gay modifications to the legal fabric, the book remarks,
"Lawrence did not cause all of this change, but it ratified and intensified
the underlying cultural shift that made it possible. It also furnished a
constitutional basis for further changes to come" (p. 284). Perhaps
unsurprisingly, in this fast-changing area of law and in the short time since
Carpenter's book has been published, other noteworthy legal changes have
been made, including changes in marriage and antidiscrimination law.
26
Bringing to mind a libertarian's solicitude for the private sphere, the book
also notes ways in which Lawrence has produced changes in private
23. Not forgetting the constitutional limits that some pro-lesbian and pro-gay legislative
measures may run into. See, e.g., Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000); Hurley v.
Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., Inc., 515 U.S. 557 (1995).
24. 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
25. 10 U.S.C. § 654 (2006), repealed by Don't Ask, Don't Tell Repeal Act of 2010,
Pub. L. No. 111-321, 124 Stat. 3515.
26. See, e.g., Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 133
S. Ct. 786 (2012) (No. 12-307); Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. granted
sub nom. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 786 (2012) (No. 12-144); Koren v. Ohio Bell Tel.
Co., No. 1:11-CV-2674, 2012 WL 3484825 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 14, 2012); see also Macy v.
Holder, EEOC Appeal No. 0120120821, 2012 WL 1435995 (Apr. 23, 2012) (finding by the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission that Title VIl's sex discrimination prohibition
includes discrimination against transgendered employees); Castello v. Donahoe, EEOC Re-
quest No. 0520110649, 2011 WL 6960810 (Dec. 20, 2011) (finding by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission that an employee stated a "plausible sex stereotyping case" under
Title VII when she claimed that she was discriminated against for "having relationships with
women"); Veretto v. Donahoe, EEOC Appeal No. 0120110873, 2011 WL 2663401 (July 1,
2011) (finding by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission that an employee stated a
plausible sex stereotyping case under Title VII when he claimed that he was discriminated
against for being a man marrying a man); Erik Eckholm, In Maine and Maryland, Victories at
the Ballot Box for Same-Sex Marriage, N.Y. T MES, Nov. 7, 2012, at P14, http://www.nytimes.
com/2012/ll/07/us/politics/same-sex-marriage-voting-election.html (discussing success of
referendums in Maine and Maryland authorizing same-sex marriage); Stacey Solie, Two Laws
Are Welcomed After Midnight in Seattle, N.Y TIMEs, Dec. 6, 2012, at A20, http://www.
nytimes.com/2012/12/07/us/two-laws-are-welcomed-after-midnight-in-seattle.html (discuss-
ing success of Washington State referendum authorizing same-sex marriage).
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conduct, where norms in relation to a broad range of private actions seem
increasingly pro-lesbian and pro-gay (p. 283). More and more corporations
and other actors in the private sector, and across the political spectrum, are
embracing Lawrence's values of respect for same-sex intimacies and their
equivalence to their cross-sex counterparts, including the decision's
neotraditional moral approval for same-sex sex (p. 283).
With all that Lawrence has produced, it may seem fitting that Law-
rence's conservatism did not seem to matter much to the lesbian, gay, and
allied revelers who celebrated the decision after it came down. This essen-
tially conservative opinion, though it leaves many lesbian and gay civil
rights successes to be achieved, does seem to have set a course that, slowly,
perhaps ineluctably, is leading toward what, for now, remains the capstone
of the modem lesbian and gay rights civil rights program: marriage equality.
Lawrence's conservatism appears not to have served as an obstacle to prom-
ising and delivering a present and a future for lesbian and gay civil rights. In
a strange way, Lawrence's conservatism has only made the call for addition-
al civil rights protections for lesbians and gay men seem more obvious,
more urgent, more necessary, and harder not to give or to doubt, because
they are no longer at or near the avant-garde of social, political, legal, or
even constitutional life. As far as lesbian and gay equality is concerned, it is
hard to hope for more.
II. LAWRENCE V TEXAS AND THE POLITICS OF THE DISPOSSESSED
Or is it?
The principal chord that Carpenter's book strikes is of Lawrence v. Texas
as an unparalleled victory for lesbian and gay civil rights, if with further
steps to go, steps it is already helping normalize. But the book also offers an
important, if underdeveloped, melodic counterpoint: a perspective on the
case that emerges through facts about its background that cast Lawrence,
including its moral conservatism, and in some ways, by extension, the civil
rights project of which it may be seen to be a part, in a distinctive, more
complex, and finally, more realistic, light.
This counterpoint is detectable in different ways throughout the book.
But its most dramatic moment arrives after the book's climax recounting
Lawrence's announcement and the celebrations for it that followed nation-
wide. Although this climax practically brings the book to a close, the story
of Lawrence told here is not quite at an end. It is reopened just long enough
to add as a coda an Epilogue that offers some updates on events.
The Epilogue begins with news about John Lawrence. "For the most
part," after the decision in "his namesake case," Lawrence "return[s] to a life
of anonymous normalcy" that "journey[s] toward a domesticated liberty
parallel[ing] the one taken by many gay men both before and after Law-
rence" (p. 279). Lawrence moves out of the apartment where he was
arrested and had lived for years and into a house that he has bought "so that
he could live with his partner, Jose Garcia," which he does until he passes
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away of a "heart-related illness ... in his home ... in the care of Jose" (p.
279).
In contrast, "[t]ime was less kind to [Tyrone] Garner" (p. 279). Follow-
ing Lawrence, Mitchell Katine "trie[s] to get national gay-rights groups to
use him as a spokesperson for the cause" (p. 279). But after Garner gets
drunk "at a national black-tie dinner in the men's honor in Washington, D.C.
and accept[s] his gay-rights award with a rambling speech, there [are] no
takers" (p. 279). Katine is quoted "speculat[ing]" that this missed opportuni-
ty "would've changed his life" (p. 279). But, Katine explains, apparently
shrugging, "he didn't have the training or education" (p. 279).
Returning to something of his pre-Lawrence life, Garner spends his re-
maining days in obscurity and penury, dying of causes uncertain, no
unequivocal diagnosis cited, after being "sick for months," and "[d]espite
his youth" (p. 280). Garner apparently does not leave behind enough money
for cremation or a headstone for a grave (p. 280). His family cannot pay
either (p. 280). While "the media, including the gay media," largely ignore
his death, Kevin Cathcart, Lambda's Executive Director, "[cialling Garner's
contributions to the gay community 'immense,'" steps in, "appeal[ing] to
that community for funds to defray disposal and funeral costs" (p. 280).
Next:
Two weeks after his death, $200 had been raised. For weeks, the civil-
rights hero's body lay in cold storage in [a] morgue. Finally, [a month or so
after his death], with only $25 more having been donated, Garner's brother
released his body to the county for cremation (at no cost). The family
wanted to place his remains in a modest metal urn, instead of a plastic bag,
and run a proper obituary.... But they needed $200 more for that and
didn't have the money. There was no memorial service for him in the gay
community. There was no funeral, period. (p. 280; endnotes omitted)
No lecture, only facts, the disappointment is felt. Someone should have
answered Cathcart's call. Tyrone Garner's body did not have to be delivered
to the state to reduce it to ashes only to be returned to his family in a plastic
bag. This is not the dignity and freedom from state interference in intimate
matters that Lawrence-which was Gamer's case, too-is supposed to rep-
resent.
The details are intended in personal terms, a collective failure to honor
the memory of this particular "civil-ights hero[]" who did so much for les-
bian and gay rights (p. 280). It is no mistake to process the passage this way.
If one does, no negative aspersions are cast on Lawrence itself. To the con-
trary, the failure to honor one of the decision's principal heroes is a failure
precisely because Lawrence is so great. Considering all that, giving Garner a
decent burial was the least that he was owed, though he actually received
less.
But there is another way to understand Garner's death and the events
surrounding it. In this view, they are not so much personal as political, rais-
ing some fundamental questions about Lawrence that are begged but never
squarely asked, analyzed, and answered in the course of Carpenter's work.
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How could Lawrence v. Texas, this great victory for lesbian and gay civil
rights, have done and meant so very little to the life of one of the two men
most central to it? Without forgetting that it formally reversed his sodomy
conviction, is it possible that Lawrence is (or was) more or less irrelevant
not only to Garner particularly, but also to the lives and welfare of other les-
bians and gay men? Does this suggest, more generally, that Lawrence's
benefits and limitations might be more capaciously rendered than they are in
the main accounting in this book? Might there even be hard costs of the de-
cision-not to the forces of traditional morality, seen as being dealt a major
setback by the case, but, counterintuitively, to lesbians and gay men and
maybe other minorities, as well?
A. A Portrait of Tyrone Garner
A handle on these questions emerges from the book's extended portrait
of Tyrone Garner and his life. To begin,
[Garner,] a black gay man[,] .... [t]he youngest of ten children[,] ... grew
up in Houston in poverty. After high school, he took a course in word pro-
cessing but that did not yield stable employment.... [H]e worked in a
variety of short-term jobs: a cook, a waiter, a dishwasher, a house cleaner.
He did not own a car or a home, and never even rented his own apartment.
Instead, he moved among the homes and apartments of family members or
friends for a few days, weeks, or months at a time. He was unemployed at
the time of his sodomy arrest in 1998. (p. 44; endnote omitted)
But Garner was not without occasional work. "About once a month ... Gar-
ner [and his boyfriend, Robert Eubanks,] took a bus to Lawrence's
apartment ["in working-class far east Houston" (p. 43)] twenty miles away
to clean and run errands for Lawrence, for which they were paid a small
wage" (p. 45).
Personally, Garner "had a quiet demeanor, at least around authority fig-
ures like police, judges, and attorneys .... He was shy, passive, and
according to those who knew him, effeminate .... When he smiled, he tend-
ed to cover his teeth with his lips, as if embarrassed by their appearance"
(p. 45). Garner's passivity is visible in public appearances where he stands
by silently as Lawrence speaks for them." Likewise, in obtaining counsel,
"[a]s Lawrence went, so went Garner."28 Garner's spoken English, quoted by
Carpenter, reflects a lively intelligence, sounding at times naturally a little
bit like Gertrude Stein. Of not speaking to his parents about his homosexual-
ity, for instance: "'I never had to tell them,'" he said. "'I think they been
knowing as long as I've been knowing'" (p. 44). Other locutions quoted
verbatim are far from high King's English. Nobody is surprised that the gay-
rights speaking circuit doesn't pan out.
In various snapshots, Garner, "living with relatives in a low-income area
of Houston," comes across as trying, but not quite fitting in (p. 279). "Nei-
27. See, e.g., p. 273.
28. P. 120; see also p. 130.
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ther Garner's white dress shirt nor his gray dress pants seemed to fit him. He
smelled of cologne" (p. 280). A relationship with spirits is suggested but not
pinned down. "[P]robably not intoxicated" the night of his sodomy arrest (p.
62), he was not "a heavy drinker,"29 though from time to time he indulged to
excess (pp. 166, 279). Not one of those moments, but memorable enough to
tell, Carpenter takes "him back home at the end of [an] interview, at about
two in the afternoon, [and Garner] ask[s] ... to stop at a comer gas station
and borrow[] some money to buy a large malt liquor beer" (p. 280).
At some point after meeting in 1990, Garner becomes boyfriends with
Robert Eubanks, an older, poor, white gay man described as a "'gun-totin',
beer-swillin', Gilley's kickin' bubba from Pasadena,' a working-class suburb
of Houston" (pp. 44-45; endnote omitted). This is the same Eubanks who
would later, in what is sometimes characterized as a fit of jealous spite,30
place the false weapons-report call that led to Garner's sodomy arrest (pp.
62-63).
Soon after meeting, Garner and Eubanks "started living together, sharing
a bedroom at the home of Garner's parents for a few months. After that, the
two men shared apartments and transient hotel rooms" (p. 45). The relation
between them was
tempestuous, to say the least. Eubanks was prone to calling Garner a "nig-
ger" when he was drunk or angry. Garner was twice charged with
assaulting Eubanks, in 1995 and again after the sodomy arrest, in 2000. In
addition to these two assault cases, Garner was arrested for possession of
marijuana, for aggravated assault on a peace officer in 1986, and for driv-
ing while intoxicated in 1990. (p. 45; endnotes omitted)
As Lawrence is pending, Eubanks sought
a court order to keep Garner away from him. In his affidavit, Eubanks ac-
cused Garner of several beatings and a sexual assault: Garner "punched me
on my left eye two times" in January 2000; beat him with a hose in 1999
while "using crack and drinking"; beat him with a belt in 1998... ; and, in
May 1998, four months before the sodomy arrests, "stabbed me on my
right finger with a box cutter, ... grabbed a hot iron and burned me," and
"then sexually assaulted me." The judge granted Eubanks's request for a
temporary restraining order, but the matter was dropped after Eubanks's
lawyer withdrew, saying she could not locate him for a scheduled hearing.
Nevertheless-and bizarrely-Garner and Eubanks continued to live to-
gether. (p. 166; endnote omitted)
The pains taken to say that Garner "had a quiet demeanor, at least around
authority figures" (p. 45; emphasis added) are taken because he didn't al-
ways. As Eubanks's affidavit attests, Garner was not always passive and shy
(p. 166).
29. P. 62. There is contradictory testimony about Gamer's sobriety the night of his
sodomy arrest. See pp. 69-70, 72, 298 n.26.
30. Eubanks's actual motives are a "mystery:' though this explanation repeatedly resur-
faces. See pp. 62, 63, 72. "According to the deputies, Eubanks volunteered that he was jealous
because his lover, Garner, was cheating on him with Lawrence." P. 77; see also p. 90.
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"[On-again, off-again," Garner's relationship with Eubanks is on again,
things seemingly looking up for the couple, just before the sodomy arrests
(p. 61). The men had "arranged to get an apartment together" and were at
Lawrence's that fateful day to get some furniture for it: two chairs, some
tables, and an old bed (p. 61).
B. The Portrait of Garner-Mobilized
The book's portrait of Garner serves multiple purposes. Perhaps first and
foremost, it ensures that his story, central to the story of Lawrence v. Texas,
is told and preserved for posterity.3 Equally significant, an early version of
the portrait is deployed as part of the book's analysis of the sodomy arrests
in which an argument is offered that they were discriminatorily motivated.
According to the book, drawing on Carpenter's first-hand investigations, no
fewer than four different social hierarchies-sexual orientation, gender,
class, and race-all visible in Garner's life, and differently in Lawrence's, as
well, were in important ways behind the decision by police to arrest and
charge the two men with violating Texas's sodomy law.32 The point of this
argument is not to sketch pleadings for a constitutional tort, 33 but to enrich
our understanding of the real-world complexities Lawrence involved.
The argument begins with "[t]he simple fact" that Garner and Lawrence
were two men engaged in sex (p. 99). "By itself, that is an acknowledgment
that antigay animus led to the arrest[s]. The thought of sexual acts between
two men elicited a special revulsion from the deputies that helps explain
why there ever was a Lawrence v. Texas" (p. 99). In addition to the general,
"antigay, hypermasculine world of good old boys" in which "[t]he deputies
were [professionally] ensconced," interviews with them revealed "their per-
sonal and deep discomfort with homosexuality" and "revulsion toward gay
men.., at work" "during the arrest[s]" (pp. 99-100). Garner and Lawrence
said that "the deputies repeatedly used homophobic slurs like 'fag' and
'queer'" (p. 100). There were also comments "about the pornographic con-
tents of Lawrence's home" (p. 100), including "a sketch on Lawrence's
wall" 34 of James Dean with "'an extremely oversized penis on him'" (p.
76), a source of fascination, derision, and "disdain" for homosexuality (p.
100). There was also the seemingly homophobic assumption that, with gay
pornography around, child pornography might also be found (p. 78). None
was (p. 78). Additionally, the lead officer at the scene "expressed fears about
coming into contact with 'fluids' from the men" (p. 100). After the physical
31. Seep. 277.
32. For Carpenter, these motives are among the "several reasons that [the lead officer
on the scene of the arrests] might have made up a story about seeing Lawrence and Garner
having sex, and why [the other officer who said he witnessed it] might have acquiesced in that
story." P. 98; see also p. 105. Not that these were the only motives involved in the arrests. Pp.
81, 87-104.
33. No such argument was ever made before the Supreme Court.
34. P 100. Elsewhere, the reference is to "sketchings" or "etchings" in the plural. P 76,
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contact of the arrests, he "advised [the other officers] to wash their
hands.... In his patrol car, ' ... I doused myself with sanitizer'" (p. 81).
Another officer, meanwhile, recounted that "he could detect homosexuality
by the disgusting smell in the apartment" (p. 100). "'That whole apartment
smelled of gay'" (p. 78). Not cologne, but "'[a]n anal odor. Very unpleas-
ant'" (p. 78; endnote omitted). (Another officer missed the scent (p. 78).)
Add to this the book's surmise that police witnessed no sex between the
men, and the suggestion by the lead officer at the scene that Lawrence and
Garner refused to stop when caught in the act and told to desist (pp. 68-69),
amounts to a "play[] [on] stereotypes of gay men as so sex obsessed they are
literally unable to control themselves," as "animals in their lust" (p. 100).
31
The idea that the officers were motivated by antigay discrimination seems,
by argument's end, to leave little room for doubt: Homophobia was a moti-
vating feature of the arrests.
Proceeding, "[c]losely related to the homophobic motive, there might al-
so have been an element of . . . 'gender anxiety' at work in the case"
(p. 101). The two officers who said that they saw Garner and Lawrence hav-
ing sex (p. 92) "harbored very traditional attitudes about the proper roles,
attitudes, dress, and manner of men and women" (p. 101). One of the offic-
ers, himself African American, said that "[w]hat bothered him most about
many gay men ... was that they are effeminate. As a kid, he remembered
another young boy who exhibited ... 'feminine twists' that unsettled him"
(p. 101). Pointing to Garner, the book explains that he "was one of those
guys with 'feminine twists'" (p. 102). The lead officer "described him as a
'naggy bitch'" (p. 102). The book links Garner's effeminacy with his pas-
sivity, as officers might have, to frame him in the officers' eyes as "a
feminized male" (p. 102). "Garner just stood by and took the abuse and or-
ders [that the police] inflicted" (p. 102). If, in fact, the police did not see
Garner and Lawrence having sex that night, it scarcely seems coincidental
that Garner's effeminacy may have caused officers to imagine him as the
bottom to Lawrence's top,36 or, in a different version, to have been the one
fellating Lawrence when the officers came in.37
The class dimensions driving the arrest follow:
Wherever gay people have been discriminated against, those at the
lowest end of the economic scale have been among the hardest hit.... It is
they who most often proved vulnerable to, and were undefended against,
police harassment.
In the same regard, there is evidence that economic class may have
played a role in the Lawrence arrests. Lawrence and Garner were neither
wealthy nor well educated. It is no accident the arrests occurred in a lower-
middle-class area .... Police charging crimes against wealthy home
35. For some discussion of what the lead officer said he saw happening in Lawrence's
bedroom and how that activity continued even after he told the men to stop, see pp. 67-70, 80,
92-93, 100-01.
36. See, e.g., p. 103.
37. See pp. 68, 304 n.53.
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owners could expect the residents to fight back with ample resources. Law-
rence and Garner, by contrast, could be expected to do nothing.38
"Beyond that, the lead officer in the case.., approached his job differently"
in the "lower-middle-class" neighborhood where Lawrence's apartment was
located (p. 102). "[R]esidents [of that area], [the officer] claimed, were less
likely to speak to police in a respectful manner, were more prone to resist
orders, and were generally less deferential" (p. 102). The officer "adapted to
the difference by getting tougher on residents" of this area (p. 102). Law-
rence, who used "foul language and defi[ed] ... [police] authority" before
and during his arrest, "would have been typical of the area, and [the officer]
would have reacted in his customarily rough way" (p. 103).
The racial dynamics and motivations said to have been involved in the
arrests, being specially freighted, receive special treatment in the book.
Treading carefully, the book notes, to begin, that the call Eubanks made say-
ing "that 'a black male' was 'going crazy with a gun'" in Lawrence's
apartment was a report that might have "used a racial slur" instead (p. 103).
Not only was the neighborhood where the arrest occurred "working-class,"
but it was "also racially polarized. The Harris County Sheriff's Office re-
flected those attitudes. Lawrence was white and Garner was black. Few have
commented on the fact that they were an interracial pair or on what role that
might have played in the relatively harsh treatment they received" (p. 103;
endnote omitted). As "one gay-rights activist familiar with the sheriff's de-
partment suspected... : 'Black guy, white guy, apartment, naked. That's all
you need,' "suggest[ing] that a mix of homophobia and racism may have
been at work" (p. 103; endnotes omitted) in the arrests.
The book clarifies that the racism charge being leveled-"[i]f racism
was present" (p. 103)-is not simply one involving white officers driven by
white supremacy. One of the officers
was black. This, too, added a potential racial element to the case. It is pos-
sible that [he], coming from a socially conservative and religious black
community, was especially offended by the sight of a black man engaged
in what he considered a morally objectionable sexual act with a white man.
This offense may have been aggravated because [or so it was said] the
black man was playing the receptive (passive, subordinate, female) role to
the white man during sex. At the scene of the arrest, Lawrence was aggres-
sive and belligerent (masculine); Garner was passive and cooperative
(feminine). [The officer] was clearly bothered that Garner was very effem-
inate, which suggests that gender anxiety and racial pride may have
produced a toxic mix. (p. 103; endnotes omitted)
For the black deputy, "Garner's homosexuality may have been experienced
as racial betrayal" (p. 104).
No sooner is this all said than it is added, "This is speculation" (p. 104).
"The deputies have not admitted that race influenced the arrests, nor would
they be expected to admit it if it had. Neither Lawrence nor Garner recalled
38. P. 102; see also, e.g., p. 98.
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any racial slurs during the arrest or during their time in prison. ... If race
played any role, it was very complicated and is unlikely ever to be acknowl-
edged explicitly by law-enforcement authorities or anyone else involved" (p.
104). But as a distinct possibility, the idea cannot be ruled out. And it is not.
All told, Carpenter's account-with its suggestion that homophobia,
sexism, classism, and racism, either individually or in combination, played
important, driving roles in producing the Lawrence arrests-seems more
than plausible, if not proven beyond a shadow of a doubt. Measured by a
certain common sense, the argument is perfectly understandable and entirely
defensible, and seems, with all its caution, more or less basically right.
C. The Inequalities in Lawrence Reconsidered
Consistent with the book's overarching humanism, which tends toward a
liberalism focusing on individuals, the discrimination presented as motiva-
tion behind the arrests begins somewhere in the social world (it is out there
and has been for a very long time) before being localized spatially (as in the
neighborhood where Lawrence lived or his apartment itself), institutionally
(as in the Harris County Sheriff's Office's norms), and temporally (this sce-
ne, this night), before then, finally, being personalized and interiorized in the
officers themselves. This is discrimination as individual, psychological mo-
tivation.
One challenge of this kind of approach is that it ordinarily supposes at
least some degree of knowable certainty of mental truths, figuring that
speech, conduct, and certain other evidence-as with the sexual orientation,
gender, and class discrimination claims-can supply a secure and clear line
of insight into the deepest, darkest recesses of the human mind. But what
the book says about the race discrimination claim seems more generally apt:
"The possibilities are intriguing but are ultimately [in some sense] unknow-
able" (p. 104). Facts there may be, but certain access to them is something
else. This is all well-heeled speculation. More problematically, it makes the
discrimination in the case finally interesting and relevant to the book's nar-
rative as the sum of individuals' psychological motivations.
Analytically prior to these psychologizing moves are the structures of
social inequality that are at work and that, in different ways, have existed for
a very long time. Whatever their origins and historical roots,39 the social
hierarchies of sexual orientation, gender, class, and race, at least in their
current forms, are drawn upon by the book as fuel for its psychologized
punch.
Taking these social hierarchies on their own terms, and viewing them as
large-scale social institutions supported by ideologies that rationalize and
justify group-based distinctions and inequalities, the book might have taken
a cleaner, more powerful, if also a more far-reaching, argumentative shot. If
it had, it might have offered that the scene of the arrests encapsulates and




crystallizes interpersonal and structural social dynamics that, once seen,
reveal how sodomy laws can be captured and made to serve as conduits for
various forms of social inequality, which they thus reflect and reinforce. 40
And, in this case, actually did.
On this view, the equality concerns with the arrests in Lawrence do not
primarily focus on discriminatorily defective psychologies, hence the illicit
motives operating in the officers' heads, personalized this way and perhaps
curable by something that could set these particular heads straight. Driving
much deeper, the challenge from this perspective is that the forces of ine-
quality at work on the scene of the arrests, once understood, need to be
confronted and rooted out to make sure they do not resurface again. Eliminat-
ing the vehicle for discriminatory expression-the sodomy ban-may be very
important. Indeed, for some it is impossible to imagine nondiscriminatory
enforcement of a sodomy law. But simply getting rid of sodomy bans will not
on its own guarantee that the same social hierarchies will not repeatedly
reemerge and converge, either on their own or together, to target and punish
lesbians and gay men for their sexual orientation, gender, class, and race.4'
The book does not string points together this way, but understanding
Lawrence as a case about social inequalities and discriminatory social con-
trol along often-intersecting lines of sexual orientation, gender, class, and
race presents a stark departure from the Supreme Court's doctrinal under-
standing of what it involves. Divorcing legal from social truths, Lawrence
posits sexual orientation as the only form of inequality implicated in the
case, and implicated by virtue of the social meaning of Texas's sodomy
ban-its "homosexual conduct" law42-- apparent on its face.43 The various
forms of discrimination that were actually working at the scene of these par-
ticular arrests, whether viewed as individual psychology shaping officers'
motivations (as the book does) or as structural inequalities shaping the dy-
namics on the ground (as they might have been), nowhere figure in
Lawrence's doctrinal footwork. Although social theorists have documented
the relation of sodomy bans and the homophobia they reflect to inequalities
of gender, class, and race,' there are no signs of these ideas anywhere in
Lawrence. The Court's opinion in the case even boldly ignores the fact
40. Another way to run these moves is in Berta E. Hemindez-Truyol, Querying Law-
rence, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 1151, 1238-39 (2004).
41. Saying this this way is not to forget, as will become clear, the ways in which others,
including heterosexuals, bisexuals, and the transgendered, might be targeted or otherwise
hanned by sex crimes law, depending on how they are written and enforced.
42. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 564 (2003).
43. See id. at 563-64, 567, 575, 578; see also id. at 580, 581-82, 583-84 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in the judgment). This even though the Court considers the social meaning of sod-
omy prohibitions across space and time, even before the "homosexual" as a social personage
appeared for the first time.
44. The theoretical connections have been traced in ways too numerous to count, but a
few illustrative examples for present purposes include Guy HOCQUENGHEM, HOMOSEXUAL
DESIRE (Daniella Dangoor trans., Duke Univ. Press 1993) (1972); SUZANNE PHARR, Homo-
PHOBIA: A WEAPON OF SEXISM (2d ed. 1997); and SIOBHAN B. SOMERVILLE, QUEERING THE
COLOR LINE (2000). Cf HoMo EcONOMICS (Amy Gluckman & Betsy Reed eds., 1997).
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that Texas's sodomy law drew a facial sex-based classification, which, in
turn, grounded an argument before the Court-that the sodomy law un-
constitutionally perpetuated gender discrimination under well-established
doctrinal tests.45 Avoiding these ideas, Lawrence makes it all wonderfully
simple: Texas's sodomy law, facially discriminatory as to sexual orienta-
tion, is otherwise neutral with respect to gender, class, and race. Neither
Texas's sodomy ban nor, by extension, any other jurisdiction's-nor, as a
result, Lawrence itself-says anything about or means anything for them.
By categorical fiat, sodomy bans are unrelated to gender, class, and race,
both facially and in operation.
46
Through a powerful turn of rhetorical events, the idea that Lawrence, be-
ing about the constitutionality of sodomy bans, is only about lesbian and
gay rights has fostered the development of a mythology that Lawrence bene-
fits all lesbians and gay men. The book furthers this myth by describing the
story of Lawrence v. Texas as the story of "how a bedroom arrest decriminal-
ized gay Americans" (book title). Implicitly, "all" gay Americans, without
qualification.
Partially right, Lawrence takes a bite out of homophobia's operation in
the criminal setting, nullifying the enforcement of what was long considered
the cornerstone and perfect embodiment of homophobia: sodomy bans. And
the decision's reverberations, as the book shows, extend beyond that to the
elimination of other forms of homophobic discrimination under law (pp.
281-84).
Notwithstanding the undoubtable and undoubted significance of these
developments, it is emphatically not the case that Lawrence banishes dis-
crimination against lesbians and gay men and their sexualities from even the
limited waters of the criminal law. Stated affirmatively, Lawrence carves up
the classes of lesbians and gay men and their sexualities into some that are
no longer criminal (and no longer may be made criminal) and others that
still are (and may be).
As others have noted, Lawrence's declaration that sodomy bans violate
constitutionally protected individual liberty respecting sexual intimacies-a
declaration that is grounded in a "neotraditional [sexual] morality" that fol-
lows, but does not lead, the nation-comes at the expense of broad
protections for consensual, same-sex sexual expressions against criminal
regulation (p. 194). While, with Kenneth Karst, some one-night (or one-hour
or five- or fifteen-minute) stands may be safeguarded under Lawrence because
from them normative intimacies may bloom,47 not all categorically are. The
forms of consensual, same-sex sexual expression that Lawrence leaves
45. For discussion, see Marc Spindelman, Gay Men and Sex Equality, 46 TULSA L.
REv. 123, 140-41 (2010), and Marc Spindelman, Surviving Lawrence v. Texas, 102 MICH. L.
REv. 1615, 1633-67 (2004) [hereinafter Spindelman, Surviving Lawrence].
46. Accord p. xii.
47. See Kenneth L. Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624, 633
& n.45 (1980). For additional reflections on the theme of sex and intimacy, see Laura A. Ros-
enbury & Jennifer E. Rothman, Sex In and Out of Intimacy, 59 EMORY L.J. 809 (2010).
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unprotected include laws barring cruising and public sex,48 as well as legal
limits on serodiscordant sexual relations.49 Also outside of Lawrence's ambit
are ostensibly nonnormative sexual practices like sadomasochism, as well as
sex-for-pay,5° whether sex workers or prostituted persons are lesbian women
or gay men or their johns are, and whether they otherwise possess certain
forms of white, upper-middle-class respectability (some do) or not. Those
closer to the social margins who engage in survival sex to satisfy different
sorts of survival needs-be they in prisons, sex-trafficking networks, or the
remainder of the free world, and engaging in transactions on the street or
other public places, or that start out there or on the internet or in clubs or
bars-fare no better under Lawrence, and might in practice fare worse, be-
cause they are more vulnerable than others to, and possess fewer resources
to defend themselves against, the crushing, hydraulic pressures of the crimi-
nal justice system. 1
What all of these lesbians and gay men and their sexual practices have in
common is Lawrence's refusal to offer them safe harbor.52 The nonprotec-
tion of these and other manifestations of lesbian and gay sexuality, as well
as the sexual cultures that they have, at times, been a part of, is a reminder
that Lawrence's elimination of sodomy bans, without more, leaves many
lesbians and gay men where they were before-as sexual outlaws-though
newly cut off from their morally upstanding lesbian and gay sisters and
brothers who are now entitled to constitutional protections for their chosen,
and dignified, intimacies.53 (Not that they cannot cover a private debauch.)
48. Cf p. 281.
49. The book raises the possibility that Eubanks may have been HIV-positive. See p. 85.
Carpenter clarifies with emphasis that "[t]here is no independent confirmation that Eubanks
was HIV-positive, had AIDS, or suffered from dementia." P. 297 n.4. A review of the pages
covered by the index entries for HIV and AIDS reveals no suggestion about Gamer's HIV
status, and there is no relevant index entry for Garner that would supply additional infor-
mation. Separately, for discussion and analysis of the often-complex relationship of HIV
transmission to same-sex eroticism and sex, see Marc Spindelman, Sexuality's Law, 24
COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 87 (forthcoming 2013), and Marc Spindelman, Sexual Freedom's
Shadows, 23 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 179 (2011). No small aside, although consensual sexual
practices like cruising, public sex, and serodiscordant sexual relations are not unique within
same-sex sexual communities, their social meanings may still be-or still are-distinctive.
The same either does or may hold true for sadomasochistic sex and sex-for-pay, though a full
analysis of the point would need to be hammered out.
50. See p. 207.
51. Again, this is not to say that these acts are unique within same-sex sexual communi-
ties, only that their social meanings may be-or are-distinctive.
52. From a legal perspective, Lawrence may be seen to deliver on its promise of formal
equality even in the context of what remains of sexual outlawry: leaving lesbians and gay men
and their sexualities to be treated as outlawed on the same formal terms as their cross-sex
counterparts.
53. These criminal regulations can ensnare them not for anything that they have done,
but simply for their actual or perceived identities or simply for being. See, e.g., JoEv L. Mo-
GUL ET AL., QUEER (IN)JusTICE: THE CRIMINALIZATION OF LGBT PEOPLE IN THE UNITED
STATES 45-92 (2011); cf p. 109.
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Given that Lawrence only decriminalizes some lesbians and gay men
and some aspects of their sexual lives, and may do so differentially based
partly on the other forms of social privilege that they have or lack, it should
come as no surprise that the decision may deliver little concrete help to les-
bians and gay men whose identities, like Tyrone Garner's, are significantly
defined by their relatively unprivileged positions in, in addition to sexual
orientation hierarchy, other social hierarchies like gender, class, and race.
An illustration of what this may practically mean begins with a feature
of Lawrence's architecture. By its formal terms, Lawrence leaves room for
state regulation of sexually intimate relations that are nonconsensual,
hence, on its logic, entail sex-based harm.54 Along these lines, Lawrence
has generally been supposed to approve the constitutional validity of exist-
ing non-consent-centered domestic violence regimes. Carpenter's book
does not say so expressly, but its description of events surrounding the
domestic-violence-protection-order case that Eubanks filed against Garner
while Lawrence was pending-a case that was ultimately dropped, with
Eubanks returning to Garner's side after a protection order against Garner
was issued-flags questions about the veracity of the charging affidavit that
Eubanks swore. Whether Eubanks's allegations, including a sexual assault
charge, were true or not-no small matter-the question the book's telling
raises is: What protection against the turning wheels of the legal system did
Garner have on his own? Presumably, he would not have received the crack-
erjack defense he received in Lawrence but for the happenstance of that
"gossipy" conversation, combined with other coincidences and circumstanc-
es that led Lambda to take his case. His economic outlook alone, deeply
marked by class disadvantage, makes it conceivable that his defense in the
protection order proceedings might ordinarily have been only what the state
might have provided him.55
But even with legal representation, Garner still faced multiple vulnera-
bilities-if not outright dangers-given his social identities and social
location, when caught in the domestic violence system's grip. Officers at the
scene of his sodomy arrest may have seen him as Carpenter suggests: as a
"naggy bitch," a limp-wristed, effeminate, passive, poor, black, gay man (p.
102). In contrast, the judge hearing the protection order case may have been
primed by Eubanks's affidavit (and, if he saw it, by Garner's own rap sheet),
along with the discriminatory social stereotypes involving sexual orienta-
tion, gender, class, and race that they triggered, to see Garner as a criminal
perpetrator already: the male-dominant aggressor, his class and race marked
by the crack he was said to have taken with drink, tormenting his poor,
white, older gay lover with fists, hose, belt, box cutter, hot iron, as well as
sexually assaulting him, presumably with his black penis. Social inequali-
ties-specifically, of sexual orientation, gender, class, and race-may have
54. The textual basis for this reading is set out in Spindelman, Surviving Lawrence,
supra note 45, at 1648-50.




coalesced in the domestic violence case in ways that, even if everything con-
tained in Eubanks's affidavit was true, backed Garner against a wall of
discriminatory cultural narratives that made it possible for him to be imag-
ined guilty long before any legal allegations were proved. If so, the ordinary,
legal presumption of innocence could have been inverted in his domestic
violence case in ways that racism and other forms of discrimination can and
otherwise do achieve.
Of course, Garner's actual vulnerabilities to the machinations of the le-
gal system are all the more unjust-and dramatically spotlighted-if the
suspicions that the book raises about Eubanks are right: that Eubanks made
the false weapons report the night of the sodomy arrest as "retaliat[ion]
against Lawrence and Garner," "jealous because [he was convinced that] his
lover ... was cheating on him with Lawrence" (p. 77). If Carpenter has the
probabilities right, there was no sex between Lawrence and Garner, hence
no sexual cheating for Eubanks to be jealous about.
Either way, Lawrence is impervious to the various inequality-based vul-
nerabilities at stake in domestic violence proceedings like those brought
against Garner. Lawrence is satisfied with the declaration that nonconsensu-
al conduct can still be regulated, even prohibited, by the state. Whatever else
this may do or mean, it does nothing to ensure that liberty like Garner's, at
stake in domestic violence proceedings, is protected from state action that
itself may be infected with, or shaped by, various kinds of social inequality,
including sexual orientation, gender, class, and race.
This is not, to be very clear, an argument for eliminating domestic vio-
lence laws, only a frank recognition that they, and for that matter other
criminal and civil law rules, remain porous to the operation of various forms
of discrimination, including discrimination that simultaneously converges
across multiple identity lines, including sexual orientation, gender, class,
and race. 6 At the same time, it is to suggest that the system must be liberat-
ed from these forms of discrimination if, as Lawrence believes can happen,
liberty is to be legally guaranteed. Lawrence, which does not address the
law's porousness to existing social hierarchies even in the narrow context of
criminal sodomy bans, scarcely takes the more ambitious step of addressing
it in the context of other laws, like laws against domestic violence, that re-
main constitutionally legitimate in its wake. The good news may be that
Lawrence leaves laws regulating intimate harms, like domestic violence
rules, intact. The bad news is that it likewise leaves them open to discrimi-
nation in ways that can scale up and out to fit the remainder of the criminal
law, and civil law, too, including in ways that will impact the lives of lesbian
and gay victims of discrimination, many of whom live lives defined by mul-
tiple forms of inequality.
And it is not only state action that intersects with and is driven by the
multiple forms of inequality that define many lesbians' and gay men's lives
that is or ought to be of concern. No less problematic than discriminatory
state action are those instances in which background social hierarchies work
56. Accord p. 107.
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to keep the state's machinery from protecting those disadvantaged by social
inequality from the harms that it can, and does, produce. This idea may be
easily understood, particularly if one thinks about it in the context of ine-
quality of race. Social inequalities can be, and are, problematic and do their
work without any action by the state. Indeed, social inequalities can affirma-
tively produce state inaction in different sorts of ways. But while the
mechanics of these operations can sometimes be brutally obvious, other
times, as in Lawrence, they can be quite subtle, a challenge to apprehend.
To see these dynamics at work in Lawrence, it is useful to recall the
Court's embrace of a neotraditional moral argument that same-sex sexual
intimacy, just like its heterosexual counterpart, is good for individual and
communitarian reasons, hence entitled to constitutional protection. To en-
sure that these intimacies get the freedom they constitutionally deserve,
Lawrence constructs around them certain legal protections-both substan-
tive and procedural-requiring the state to presume that sexual intimacy is
consensual, hence harmless, if it happens, hence should be left alone unless
and until nonconsent, hence harm, is legally shown. This makes it sound like
Lawrence securely protects victims of sexual abuse from the private harms
they suffer. And that one can and should be confident that state action
against private harms is firmly on the scene.
On closer inspection, however, the truth in many instances may be
something else again. Lawrence's legal rule may formally allow prosecu-
tions for nonconsensual sexual activity as individual harm. But without
more, it leaves entirely untouched the various ways in which, in the social
world, multiple, intersecting forms of social inequality target individuals as
possible objects of sexual violence and abuse precisely because of their dis-
advantaged, hence diminished, social status. This diminished social status
can not only ground its own erotic appeal, but do so while making any sex-
based injuries that result seem, when not affirmatively wanted, minimal or
nonexistent, or anyway tendentious, if not flat out incredible. The permission
that Lawrence gives the state to criminalize sexual harms when the state
proves nonconsent neither addresses nor remedies these inequalities. Nor does
Lawrence stop them from impacting the legal system's operation by under-
mining or practically negating the formal protections for victims of sex abuse
that it actively imagines they will receive. The impact of all this is that Law-
rence holds out what for many will prove to be an empty promise of
effective legal recourse for the sexual injuries they suffer, a new "tolerated
residuum" of sex abuse.
57
A more granular sense of what is at stake here comes by considering
some of the challenges someone in Gamer's situation might encounter if
sexually injured and attempting to advance a legal claim of harm. Gay
men's claims of sexual injury are increasingly known to confront social and
legal obstacles, being, as gay men regularly are, complexly situated in rela-
tion to norms of sexual orientation and gender. These norms can make gay
57. See Duncan Kennedy, Sexual Abuse, Sexy Dressing, and the Eroticization of Domi-
nation, in SEXY DRESSING, ETC. 126, 137 (1993).
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men, as men, seem sexually invulnerable, hence unharmable and unharmed,
particularly at the hands of other gay men, who can themselves be imagined
to be too effeminate to want to perpetrate sexual violence, rather than, as all
gay men are stereotypically thought to be, desirous of sex abuse.
For someone in shoes like Garner's, socially, hence legally, salient ine-
qualities of class and race could easily complicate the picture, though it is
not clear in advance whether they might improve the baseline situation or
make it worse. How would authorities, including police, prosecutors, judges,
jurors, not to mention social workers, parole officers, or other system play-
ers, or other private actors, including friends or acquaintances inside the
multiple communities within which someone like Garner might move, per-
ceive him if he came forward claiming sexual abuse? Given currently
widespread assumptions about the sexually oriented and gendered dimen-
sions and pathways of sexual violence-it is something that straight men do
to women-someone like Garner might be aided if seen as Carpenter sug-
gests he was seen at the scene of his sodomy arrest: feminine, passive,
meek, bottom-ish. But that is only a "might." It assumes the law would help
a gay gender nonconformist, a feminine homosexual, or more precisely, a
black, feminine homosexual, who is already so far from the norms of
straight, white masculinity that it might be hard to perceive any harm-like
the loss of manhood, autonomy, or dignity through sexual violation-for the
legal system to repair. It is also worth asking: What would it mean-what
would the legal system be understood to be producing-if it repaired a loss
like that?
In different directions, someone in Garner's position might be further
disadvantaged if viewed as he appeared in Eubanks's protection order affi-
davit: masculine, aggressive, violent, weapon wielding, drug crazed, top-ish,
not just any out-of-control gay man, but engaging racist and class-based
stereotypes with their deeper and broader resonances, making him into "a
raving, vicious bull, running at large upon the highways, seeking whom he
should devour; ... [who himself] should be penned up where he would have
no more such opportunities to commit such abominable and detestable
crimes" (pp. 16-17). Of course, the granting of a protection order, even if
the case involving it was dropped, given a rap sheet like Garner's, which
included prior charges of partner assault, marijuana possession, aggravated
assault of a peace officer, and drunk driving, might-as in the domestic vio-
lence case-set someone like Garner up to be seen as guilty unless
somehow clearly shown otherwise. Guilt that is socially constructed like
this, related in deep and intersecting ways to sexual orientation, gender,
class, and race inequalities, could well make a complaint for sexual injury
by someone like Garner seem outlandish, at least as an injury that the law
should redress. If so, the legal system might leave him-notwithstanding
any law on the books prohibiting same-sex sexual harms-with no other
option but self-help, imagined sufficient in a situation like his, given what
might be imagined as a capacity and talent for inflicting violence on others.
All of which might eventuate an otherwise imagined conclusion: that if sex
involving him happened, he, by definition, did not stop it, which, had he
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wanted to, he could have. Therefore, he must have wanted it. Therefore, no
injury ever took place.58 Lawrence leaves this mode of thinking undisplaced.
This does not mean Lawrence is of no help at all to victims of same-sex
sex abuse. It may in fact offer some victims some assistance, however indi-
rectly, by normalizing homosexuality the way it does, thus easing the burden
for some lesbians and gay men, among others, to complain about sex-based
harms. That said, this normalization benefit might not extend equally across
the social board. The more intimate the context of the abuse, the harder it
may be to overcome Lawrence's paean to intimacy, an effect that may prac-
tically normalize intimacies unequally along lines of gender, class, and race
with those possessing more gender, class, and race privilege enjoying it
more. At the same time, Lawrence's constitutional modification of legal
standards of proof involving same-sex sexual harm (alterations driven by the
decision's embrace of a neotraditional moral norm of intimacy) seems to
move in the direction of making it easier, even obligatory, for the state, in
the name of securing constitutional liberty for intimacy, to treat some actual
sexual harms-which the state cannot prove after Lawrence, and might not
have needed to prove before it-as legal nonharms. This brackets, for now,
how Lawrence's identification of sexuality- and relationship-based harms as
individual harms misses the ways in which victims of private sex abuse can
be and often are injured not simply as individuals, but as members of social-
ly subordinated groups, forms of subordination that the abuse being suffered
reflects and reinforces.
5 9
Taken together, these various observations show some of the complex
ways that Lawrence, notwithstanding its liberation of some forms of
same-sex sexual intimacy, leaves the lives of lesbians and gay men to be
complexly regulated by various hierarchies of inequality, sometimes
through processes of the state being commandeered by forces of social ine-
quality, and sometimes by those same forces operating effectively to negate
the orderly function of the state's rules.
For some, this might be enough to establish that Lawrence, both on its
own and as a victory for the lesbian-and-gay-civil-rights program, has more
of a mixed record than would ordinarily be gleaned from the main chord
struck by Carpenter's book. But the record, it turns out, is still more varie-
gated than that.
One way that social hierarchies, like the hierarchies of sexual orienta-
tion, gender, class, and race, manifest themselves is through deprivations of
a range of basic goods that are thought useful, if not also necessary, to the
development and exercise of the attributes of liberty and autonomy, and that
also function as signs of acknowledgment of an entitlement of
58. Thoughts along these general lines emerged during oral arguments in Lawrence.
See p. 228. For further discussion, see Spindelman, Surviving Lawrence, supra note 45, at
1643-48.




persons to equal concern and respect.60 The portrait of Garner in Carpenter's
book, which helps ground the argument that his sodomy arrest and Law-
rence's were driven by illicit motivations, also reveals a range of basic goods
that he apparently lacked: education or skilled-jobs training that landed him
a steady, decent job; quality (and regular) healthcare (including dental care),
mainly still a benefit of employment; a stable home, sometimes a benefit of
employment, too; as well as mobility in the form of private transportation in
a city like Houston where driving is freedom, public transportation being
"skeletal" (p. 44). The book shows how a number of these realities of Gar-
ner's life exerted a powerful influence on the opportunities afforded to him
in it, including those, like the financial opportunities Lawrence might have
provided, that he could-and could not-readily seize.61 Sadly, these same
realities seem to have affected him in sickness and death.
62
All this can be, and within certain models of individual responsibility
might be, figured as Garner's own failure, one he continually repeated by
not lifting himself out of his circumstances of disadvantage, showing-at
least while he was alive-a lack of desire or aptitude to achieve, hence mak-
ing his deprivation his chosen lot in life, desert.
A different perspective on this situation understands it to bear an im-
portant relationship to the social hierarchies that otherwise also held Garner
and his life opportunities as strings in their hands. Seen this way, his cir-
cumstances and the circumstances of others like him are not simply
remediable through more, better, or smarter exertions of individual self-help
or a better hand up offered on a purely individual basis. Rather, if they are to
be systematically addressed, it should be through a deeply redistributive and
broad-based political program that comprehends how existing social hierar-
chies of inequality shape lives of and in disadvantage, while limiting access
to that range of important, basic goods that can, in turn, shrink life's options
and its available meanings. The remedy for these problems, it is supposed, is
individual and collective action-self- and other help-channeled into ac-
tion challenging existing social hierarchies and the disadvantages they
produce, and working toward their elimination to ensure that the goods they
cause to be maldistributed become more equally available.
Needless to say by now, a comprehensive redistributive political project
like this is utterly foreign to Lawrence, with its conservative moralism and
willingness to follow, but not lead, the nation that propels it. But as with
Gamer's own life circumstances, it is important not to miss the bigger pic-
ture and larger forces at work. While Lawrence's conservatism is in some
sense uniquely its own, it also importantly reflects a much deeper strain of
conservatism that pervasively defines the Supreme Court's constitutional
politics, including (maybe particularly) those instances in which notions of
liberty, autonomy, and equality under the Fourteenth Amendment are con-
60. See Robin West, Progressive and Conservative Constitutionalism, 88 MIcH. L. REv.
641,697-98 (1990).
61. Seep. 44.
62. See pp. 279-80.
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cerned. This constitutional conservatism regularly takes the form of a nega-
tive constitutionalism that regards the Court's constitutional decisions as
properly serving as a check or veto on governmental action resulting from
ordinary politics. Except in the most unusual and highly truncated circum-
stances, it does not entail decisions announcing affirmative demands or
obligations on the state. Thus, if one sees the needs, both the individual- and
group-based needs, involved in a case like Lawrence from a perspective like
Garner's, Supreme Court action is (virtually) always guaranteed to come up
short. No matter what the advocates of lesbian and gay rights argued, the
Court would not have delivered a decision in Lawrence that offers or even
gestures toward a constitutional right to a range of basic social goods that
hierarchies of social inequality keep individuals from getting or getting fair
access to. Likewise, no matter what the advocates of lesbian and gay rights
argued, the Lawrence Court would not have delivered a decision affirming a
right to liberty or autonomy that includes freedom from social hierarchies of
sexual orientation, gender, class, and race.
The treatment Lawrence receives in Carpenter's book may make it seem
as though the Court's opinion in the case, even if it itself does not offer any
radically redistributive outcome, might not block it in the political realm.
After all, with respect to the lesbian and gay politics of civil rights, Law-
rence does not deliver everything on its agenda, whether a right to marry or
to military service, or the expansion of existing civil rights laws to include
nondiscrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. Without delivering
these items, Lawrence, as seen in Carpenter's book, does not block them,
but leaves open the possibility for them to be politically achieved. More,
Lawrence is seen sympathetically to line up with the logic of nondiscrimina-
tion on sexual identity grounds. That being the case, it might likewise be
believed that, with respect to a more ambitious politics of redistribution, the
bottom line is no different. Lawrence may not giveth, but it doesn't taketh
anything away either.
That is certainly one possibility. But another that is becoming increas-
ingly clear over time is that Lawrence, far from remaining neutral as to an
aggressive politics of redistributive reform, actually may be opposed to it in
some basic, but widely unnoticed, ways.
To see why, it may be helpful to notice that Lawrence's convergence
with a politics of lesbian and gay civil rights may be more wish fulfillment
than solid fact. Lawrence's logic may clearly seem applicable to governmen-
tal discrimination against lesbians and gay men, as in a right to marry or to
military service, but it need not apply more (or much more) broadly, if it
applies to that.
Stated more directly, Lawrence's civil rights logic may in some respects
be more conservative than the mainstream lesbian-and-gay-civil-rights pro-
gram that, in Carpenter's book, is seen to have produced it. Properly
understood, Lawrence's moral and institutional conservatism may be a re-
flection of deeper forces of negative constitutionalism that carry with them a
deep skepticism about the project of governance, including lawmaking it-
self, broadly assuming liberty, autonomy, and equality are what individuals
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have-and have as individuals, regardless of their membership in
groups-before the government acts and takes them away. If so, Law-
rence's declaration of an equation between same-sex and cross-sex
intimacies may be less aimed at the elimination of heterosexual supremacy
than an announcement of the end of laws and legal rules that draw distinc-
tions along sexual orientation lines. Consistent with this view, it is possible
that legal rules against sexual orientation discrimination could be allowed to
make their way into positive law, like antidiscrimination law, more than they
already have. But the novelty of the new floor of sexual orientation neutrali-
ty in law that Lawrence announces may come along with a harder-to-see
equality ceiling, the effects of which for lesbians and gay men and other
minorities have not yet been fully appreciated.
In isolation, a ceiling of sexual orientation neutrality-or what might be
thought of, following Robert Chang and the late Jerome Culp, as a rule of
"sexuality-blindness" 63-might well be worth the price of establishing as a
new baseline a floor of sexual orientation nondiscrimination. But before any
final calculation is made, the effects of that ceiling-on lesbians, gay men,
and other minorities-should be recognized and assessed. For while Law-
rence is busy producing one set of reactions in relation to sexual
orientation-delight about a new constitutional baseline that seems very
pro-lesbian and pro-gay-it may actually, at the same time, be feeding into
and strengthening legal norms that in other contexts-like race, gender, and
class-appear to have less felicitous effects.
Comparisons between Lawrence and Brown v. Board of Education,' as
well as between Lawrence and Loving v. Virginia," are now well known,
widely accepted, and no longer rejected out of hand. 66 In a similar vein,
though not so commonly considered, are the connections between Law-
rence and other race-equality rulings like the Supreme Court's affirmative
action decisions in Grutter v. Bollinger 67 and Gratz v. Bollinger,68 which
may be replicated and extended when revisited in Fisher v. University of
Texas at Austin.
69
63. See Chang & Culp, supra note 17, at 235-36. Chang and Culp see this rule of sexu-
ality blindness operating in Romer v. Evans, which opens with the first Justice Harlan's
admonition in Plessy v. Ferguson "that the Constitution 'neither knows nor tolerates classes
among its citizens.'" Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (quoting Plessy v. Ferguson, 163
U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
64. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
65. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
66. For comparisons to Brown, see pp. 211, 259, 264; Spindelman, Surviving Law-
rence, supra note 45, at 1615-16 n.4. For comparisons to Loving, see Pamela S. Karlan,
Forevord: Loving Lawrence, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1447 (2004). For discussion of the "Loving
analogy," see Marc S. Spindelman, Reorienting Bowers v. Hardwick, 79 N.C. L. REv. 359
(2001).
67. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
68. 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
69. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 132 S. Ct. 1536 (2012) (granting certiorari).
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Interestingly, Carpenter's book issues a reminder that only a few days be-
fore Lawrence was decided, Grutter7° and Gratz,7' cases involving admissions
policies at the University of Michigan, were handed down (pp. 253-54). The
book points to these decisions largely as temporal coincidences, suggesting
that they, or at least Justice Kennedy's opinions in them, "augured little for
Lawrence because Kennedy had long sided with conservatives in cases re-
garding racial issues" (p. 254). Dutifully, the book notes that the cases
substantively split, one upholding Michigan Law School's affirmative action
plan, the other striking down an undergraduate admissions policy on consti-
tutional grounds. Despite these results, however, uniting both decisions is an
underlying logic that state-based affirmative action conflicts with constitu-
tional equality norms because it expressly considers race, hence violates a
principle of strict racial neutrality, or colorblindness, as it is often called.
72
This principle, poised to be deepened and expanded if Justice Kennedy's
opinions embracing it rule the day in Fisher, is a race-based analogue of the
largely overlooked ceiling that may come with Lawrence's floor. Registered
succinctly, the thought is: Constitutional colorblindness is a principle that
may be supported and lent credibility, even authority, by Lawrence and its
sexuality blindness norm.
Connected this way, Lawrence may deliver lesbians and gay men like
Garner some sexual-intimacy rights while making it harder for them and
others to overcome social conditions of race inequality through educational
advancement, remembering what affirmative action means for people of
color, women and men, poor and not, regardless of their gender identity, and
no matter whether they are lesbian, gay, bisexual, or straight. Affirmative
action programs, after all, are no more singularly about race than Lawrence
is singularly about sexual identity. This being so, it should be asked: Could
the end of race-based affirmative action be the end of gender-based
admissions considerations? Single-sex, women-only education? Are sexual-
orientation-conscious admissions decisions far behind?
These questions, with their possible answers, point to deeper questions
of principle: How far might constitutional colorblindness go? As in Law-
rence itself, so long as laws are racially neutral on their face, the
constitutional command of colorblindness is satisfied, no matter how laws
impact race-defined constituencies or how they are discriminatorily en-
forced, if they are.73 If colorblindness is truly the new norm-if, in Chief
Justice Roberts's words, "[t]he way to stop discrimination on the basis of
race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race" 74 -aren't existing civil
70. Grutter, 539 U.S. 306.
71. Gratz, 539 U.S. 244.
72. This holds true even in the case upholding Michigan Law School's affirmative ac-
tion plan. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 341-43.
73. But see Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886). Compare id., with Washington v.
Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).




rights protections that are written expressly in racial terms in order to get
society beyond them in the colorblind Constitution's crosshairs? In their
applications in individual cases, don't they require the state to take account
of race in order to get beyond it? Political realities may make the use of a
constitutional colorblindness principle to strike at the heart of existing civil
rights protections seem legally implausible.75 But consistent with a strict
logic of colorblindness, particularly when that logic combines with constitu-
tional skepticism about governmental action-logic with which Lawrence
may itself be consistent, and which Lawrence may weave that much more
deeply into the fabric of constitutional law-can the possibility be entirely
dismissed?76 It has scarcely been that long since, in United States v. Morri-
son,77 gender-based civil rights took a hit that, in the process, weakened the
doctrinal foundations of existing civil rights legislation enacted under either
the Commerce Clause or the enforcement provision of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
78
In not unrelated directions, to understand Lawrence as enacting a deep
status-quo bias that maintains an active skepticism about governmental ac-
tion because of the possibility it will infringe on individual rights paves the
way for an appreciation of how Lawrence resonates with the recent decision
on the constitutionality of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act,
79
a federal program that, on a fundamental level, notwithstanding its corporat-
ist twist, aims for broad-based, class-welfare redistribution of health care as
a public good. In that decision, especially the joint dissent, which Justice
Kennedy joined, there are unmistakable echoes of Lawrence, including its
view that the Constitution presumes that liberty and freedom exist as of
right before the government acts to take them away.80 To be sure, Lawrence
is not the cause of these sounds-sole or otherwise. But once noticed, they
nevertheless expose Lawrence's underlying constitutional conservatism in a
way that clarifies that the constitutional version of civil rights that lesbian-
and-gay-rights advocates were bargaining for in the case may be, as the
Court embraced it, less open to programs of redistribution that are more am-
bitious than the lesbian-and-gay-civil-rights politics themselves are. To the
extent that lesbian-and-gay-civil-rights politics stand with affirmative action
or the Affordable Care Act, or both, maybe not even that.
75. But see Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 594 (2012); Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist.
No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 201-06 (2009) (noting that racial protections requiring fed-
eral preclearance of any change to state election procedures in § 5 of the Voting Rights Act
may no longer be constitutional as "[t]hings have changed in the South").
76. Not that it is not a longshot. See Richard A. Primus, Equal Protection and Dispar-
ate Impact: Round Three, 117 HARv. L. REv. 493, 526 (2003).
77. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
78. Compare id. at 612-13, 615-19, with Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379
U.S. 241, 252-53, 255-57 (1964), and Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 299-301
(1964). But see United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558, 573 (1995).
79. Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
80. Id. at 2643 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Alito, JJ., dissenting); see also id. at 2587,
2588, 2591 (majority opinion).
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Consistent with this last observation, if somewhat impressionistically,
Lawrence's aggressive form of rational-basis review-which formally refuses
to declare homosexuality a suspect classification-seems to have contributed
to an expanding, general warrant for close judicial inspection of ordinary so-
cial and economic legislation in a range of cases. The Affordable Care Act
decision-and not only the joint dissent Justice Kennedy signed-may be an
illustration. To repeat, Lawrence is in no way the sole or a primary cause of
the aggrandizement of judicial power, not even close to it. Much more mod-
estly, the point is that Lawrence is not wholly innocent of this dynamic either.
More, it is to recognize that, as a decision that has been widely trumpeted (in-
cluding in Carpenter's book) as a case involving a great civil rights victory, it
has played a part in helping to normalize and validate a longer line of cases
before and after it gathering and deploying judicial power. In these cases, the
extraordinary deference to representative government and its law products in
the area of ordinary social and economic reform, negotiated around the Great
Depression significantly in the interest of creating room for progressive class-
welfare legislation, is and has been increasingly coming under pressure, if it is
not slowly being undone.8' An opinion like the one Justice Kennedy signed in
the Affordable Care Act case and, to the extent that it squares with it, the ma-
jority opinion in that case, as well, is not only significant for what it does, but
also as a sign of what else may come under the gun of judicial-supremacist
judicial review.
Stepping back from these details to draw various strands together, it
should now be clearer how and why Lawrence, which has been seen as do-
ing and meaning so much for lesbians and gay men, and also to have been
an unequivocal victory for the lesbian and gay politics of civil rights, could
practically have meant so little to and in Tyrone Garner's life beyond the
formal invalidation of his sodomy conviction. Lawrence is a decision that,
by its terms, only addresses sexual orientation discrimination, and its means
of addressing even that are limited. It does not see or respond to the multiple
forms of inequality that many lesbians and gay men live and face. It does
not see, much less address, the broad and deep forms of structural inequali-
ty, whether on individual or intersecting grounds of sexual orientation,
gender, class, or race. It does not see or apprehend, much less address, that
with these forms of structural inequality often comes the maldistribution of
important social goods needed to possess and exercise liberty and autonomy,
and which are also signs of equal concern and respect delivered. And, rather
81. A decision by the Supreme Court recognizing that sexual orientation discrimination
triggers heightened scrutiny, see Windsor v. United States, 699 F3d 169, 181-85 (2d Cir.
2012), cert. granted sub nom. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 786 (2012) (No. 12-307),
and the Obama Administration has maintained that it does, see Letter from Eric H. Holder, Jr.,
Attorney Gen., Dep't of Justice, to John A. Boehner, Speaker, U.S. House of Representatives
(Feb. 23, 2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/February/il-ag-223.html,
might help in some respects to alleviate these pressures, though what Lawrence has already
done, it has already done. A closer analysis of the move may reveal problems with heightened
scrutiny for sexual orientation discrimination, notwithstanding the view that it would be a
singular victory for lesbian and gay civil rights.
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than remaining neutral with respect to efforts through politics and law to
respond to various existing social hierarchies and to promote a more egali-
tarian distribution of social goods, Lawrence may stand in the way in ways
that disadvantage lesbians and gay men, particularly but not only those
who also live other social inequalities at the same time, as well as mem-
bers of other socially subordinated groups.
To offer these assessments, putting these additional costs of the Supreme
Court's decision in Lawrence v. Texas on the table, will undoubtedly seem to
some, perhaps many, like Lawrence is being damned. A far cry, certainly,
from the principal chord Carpenter's book strikes about the case, so upbeat,
so positive, which makes for such a wonderful read because, within it, Law-
rence is basically such a happy tale. The value of this story-like the value
of Lawrence, as reflected in this book-is not just as a reassurance for those
who already see or who are easily persuaded to see Lawrence as a great tri-
umph in the march for civil rights. It is also that, in showing how much
more complex Lawrence is than the "pancaked" version of it found in the
United States Reports (p. xii), the book renders a bigger, better, and more
granular and accurate picture of the decision. From this picture emerges a
counterpoint, including a portrait of one of the men central to the case, Ty-
rone Garner, that points to a larger perspective on the decision, including
features and implications of it-what it means, in particular, for lesbians and
gay men whose lives are, like Gamer's was, marked by a range of social
inequalities, and what it means for others whose lives are also lived in deep-
ly unequal terms-that have been largely invisible and unexplored until
now. To recognize and explore that perspective, to bear witness to what
Lawrence may mean in its fuller light-its benefits, particularly seen from
the perspective of a lesbian and gay politics of civil rights, and its costs, par-
ticularly seen from the perspective of those for whom multiple, intersecting
social inequalities and disadvantages are the realities of life-is not to make
a case for a single, simple perspective on Lawrence, but the reverse: to rec-
ognize, as this book does, the many stories of Lawrence that can and should
be told. Recognizing what Carpenter's book achieves, along with the efforts
of others that it seeks to record, the call is for greater insight into a decision
that has widely been glorified as a singular victory for civil rights. About
that, remembering Tyrone Garner, as the book urges, it asks: What does this
symbol really stand for and do? And for whom?
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